I’m sure many people saw the headlines late last week. The U.S. Department of Justice charged close to a dozen representatives of Full Tile Poker and Poker Stars with bank fraud, money laundering, and other related crimes. The two sites’ domains were seized by the feds (since released) and they stopped allowing U.S.-based players to participate in real-money games.

Some people’s responses were along the lines that they were shocked–shocked!–that gambling was going on here. Never mind that it’s well-documented that poker is a game of skill (that does have some random elements, to be sure). Others wondered why, on the heels of the mostly-failed Barry Bonds trial and the Republicans deciding to spend upwards of $500 million to defend DOMA, why they were also spending taxpayer dollars on this pursuit.

And some people thought that playing poker online in the U.S. is illegal.

It isn’t. (Well, unless you live in the state of Washington.)

What about the UIGEA (the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, passed by Congress and signed into law in 2006)? Here’s the thing: the UIGEA doesn’t ban gambling online. What it does ban is websites hosting gambling games, as well as poker, from knowingly accepting payments or deposits for gaming. It’s a subtle but significant difference. Anyone who claims online poker is illegal is simply wrong.

On the heels of the passage of UIGEA, most banks and credit cards stopped processing payments to those site, payments that were monies used to play online poker. And that was the idea behind the law: prevent people from putting money online and you shut down the gaming, so you don’t have to out-and-out make online gaming illegal. Basically, a wishy-washy way to take a stand without actually taking a stand, so typical of politicians these days.

Well, sites looked for ways around the law as it was written. Different types of payment processors popped up. Lawyers for the sites looked for loopholes and omissions. And as people learned about the ways around UIGEA, online poker continued to flourish.

Whats interesting is that online poker doesn’t take business away from brick-and-mortar establishments. On the contrary, it increases business overall, one reasons why we saw in recent years a boom in establishments offing poker–and why many have failed, not because of online poker, but because in many areas, there was simply a glut of tables. Which makes it even more puzzling that the backers of a California law to tax and restrict online poker are the poker rooms and Indian casinos of the state.

But back to the UIGEA and the indictments. It seems, according to the government’s claims, that some at or near the top of FTP and PS may have pushed the loopholes a bit too far. Far enough to attract the attention of bored U.S. attorneys (or mistakenly annoyed casino executives, themselves large political contributors, who in turn put a bug in the ear of bored U.S. attorneys), and now we have the two largest poker sites not taking business from their largest customer base.

For me, that’s where I have my accounts. They are small accounts. I play online very occasionally, and for very small amounts. I actually put a small deposit into my PS account not that long ago solely to play the “Home Games” feature with friends. I’d not joined any tournaments yet, but I was very sporadically playing some no-limit poker–$1 or so at a time playing $0.01/$0.02 blinds–and after just a couple of hours of play overall, I was up something on the order of 50 cents.

Quite frankly, the UIGEA was an onerous, meddlesome, partisan piece of puritanistic dreck, foisted on us unwanted by moralistic morons who parrot the party line that government must be ever smaller–unless they feel the need to insert government into your life. The few smart, sensible minds in Congress were working carefully to repeal UIGEA and replace it with well-thought-out regulation and taxation–until the Tea Partiers lied their way into infesting Congressional seats and began imposing their proudly ignorant and narrow world views, views that do not include any notions of personal freedoms, on the land, and in the process, threatening to stop and progress on any work unless they got they way. Sort of like 6-year-olds.

So UIGEA repeal was stopped in its tracks and he feds are spending money on this prosecution.

I can’t condone FTP and PS executives if they did indeed push too far. By the same token, I can hardly fault them for trying, for doing what they needed to do to keep their business successful and thriving. But it all leaves lots of people in limbo.

What’s going to be really interesting is to see if this creates an influx of players into brink-and-mortar rooms across the country. I can say so far I’ve not seen in big influx at Artichoke Joe’s, but the data sample may still be too small. What’ll be interesting also is to see how online players will adapt to live play, adapt from multi-tabling hundreds of hands an hour to the single-table snail’s pace of maybe 30 hands an hour, and what that will do to their game. For those of us who are reasonably good at live games, it could make them more lucrative, as an important aspect to winning play is patience.

Meanwhile, I urge you to contact your Representative and Senator and ask them to repeal the UIGEA. Let us play our poker.

Musings, Rants | No Comments »

Poker is not a linear endeavor. Unlike building a house, you don’t pour a foundation, put up the frame, add the siding, and work the finishing touches until you get to the point where you have a finished product. It’s a lot more like a Sissyphean task, where you think you are making progress, only to have the gods of chance slap you back down. The past two days show both sides of that coin.

I got myself up early to get to Artichoke Joe’s and get in a good bit of play before the 11:00am morning tournament. Despite the horrendous traffic, because of the awful weather, over the few miles, I still got there by 9:00am–just in time to have had the overnight $6/$12 game just break up. In a way, that wasn’t a bad thing, because you really don’t want to get into a short game that is on the verge of breaking.

But I was the first name on the list, and it took an hour to get enough folks in to get the game back going, giving me only an hour before tournament time, typically the minimum I prefer playing in situations such as those. And in that hour I only won one small pot. The rest of the time, I missed everything, including one hand with 10-10 where I raised preflop, saw it checked around on a Q9x board, and when one player bet the turn, I though he was betting either a weak Q or a 9. I was partially right: He had two 9s!

So I headed to the tournament down about $80. The first hand I saw was AJo, and I open-raised. Only the big blind called. He checked to me on a Q-high board, I made a continuation bet, and he folded. A small pot to start the tournament. I joked at the time that it you have to win the first one to not win any more. How right I would be.

Although I had several pocket pairs in the 4-plus rounds I lasted–including pocket 2s 3 times–I never hit a thing. I got my last few chips in as a small favorite heads up, but the other player hit his lowest card on the flop and I never improved, going out 20th of the 47 players who started. Jus a total whiff of a day.

Today, I decided to hit the club a bit later, and I arrived about noon. There was a short list, but just as it got a bit longer, someone would get up from the only game, so for a long time, more than an hour, it never got to the point where they could start a second game. Finally, more than an hour after I arrived, we spread a second game.

I was on the button the first hand, which started short, just 7 people. Interestingly, everyone folded to me, and when I found KJs, I raised. The big blind called, checked a Q-10-8 flop, and folded to my continuation bet, parroting the day before.

However this day would turn out differently. In fact, it happened the very next hand. We got up to 8, and several limped to me, one off the button, and I found two black aces. Well, this would be interesting. Against 5 players, pocket aces are on average about a 50-50 proposition long term. But you can’t be timid, so of course I raised. Interestingly, the big blind folded, but 4 others called.

Then something unexpected happened. The player on my immediate right raised.

Understand that the limp-reraise move is (a) rare and (b) a powerful play, at least when used by people who understand it. I’m not sure if he knew about its power or was simply trying to build a bigger pot. Regardless, I made it 4 bets, only to see 4 others cold-call the 2 additional bet. The player on my right chose not to cap, but only called to close the action. 6 of use saw a Q-high flop with 2 clubs.

It was checked to the player on my right, who bet. I raised, worrying only about QQ. @ players cold called, and the better also only called. A small card came on the turn, and it was checked to me. I bet out, one folded, but two called. I have to tell you I was worried about a check-raise by the person on my right, but it didn’t happen. The river brought a small red card, and both players checked to me.

I thought whether I should bet for value or just check it down. I really didn’t know where I was in the hand, maybe seeing monsters in the closet, someone making a donkey two pair with that river card, so I thought about it for a few seconds, then rapped the table and showed my aces. But both folded and I pulled in a massive pot that was a bit over $200.

A couple orbits later, I saw that the person on my right was very, very loose, seeing almost every flop, so I suspect his preflop 3-bet was a pot builder, not a sign of any strength. A gambler. Gamblers are good, but they also raise the variance of the game. So I decided to cut the session extra short. After waiting for more than an hour and after playing for less than half an hour, I racked up, cashing out for a $170 profit.

The most interesting part of this whole equation is that on both days, I won only two hands each.

I commented to one of the floor people shortly after I won the big pot that it was entirely possible that the most important decision I would make today was whether or not I got up from the table with my profit or risked it for more. Because long-term success at the poker table is built on the foundation of good decisions, I think this decision (to get up when I did) help build my house skyward.

Hand Analysis, Stories From the Trenches | No Comments »

I had an interesting hand in my last $6/$12 session at Artichoke Joe’s. Before I can get to the hand, I have to set it up.

It was a new table, and I was one of the last ones called. I was happy with the seat for one reason, because a layer I knew was rather tough, a bit loose but rather aggressive who attacked weakness, was on my right, but I was unhappy with my seat because another player I knew, who played a very aggressive no-limit frequent raise style, was on my left.

After nearly an hour, I had played very little, in that I put money in the pot with few hands. The player on my immediate left, however, had never folded once preflop. While he would sometime raise light, he would never, ever fold without seeing a flop, even if he had to cold call. He almost always would bet on the flop or turn if checked to.

I had decided to change up a bit when I found KJo UTG+1 and open-raised. I got 4 cold callers, including the player on my right, and hit a miracle flop of KKx. I bet, got two callers. The turn was a blank. I checked, expecting the player on my left to bet out. But to my surprise, it was checked around. Another blank on the river, and I bet out, and everyone folded. The player on my right said “Two jacks, eh?”

The very next hand, I got AK0 UTG and raised. I don’t often like to raise on two consecutive hands, but sometimes I do, and this was one of those cases. The player on my left cold called, as did one other LP player, someone I knew chased a lot, and the BB completed. The flop came AJ5 with 2 hearts. It was checked to me. I decided to play it a bit differently: I checked, hoping I could call a weaker ace betting there and get a raise in on the turn.

Unfortunately, it was checked around. A blank fell on the turn–and the BB bet out. Well, I took that opportunity to raise. The BB reacted in surprise, saying that he thought I had nothing. The LP player cold-called 2 bets, and the BB called my raise and went all-in for 5 chips more. I had put the cold-caller’s call as a flush draw, so I just called, expecting him to overcall. I was not wrong.

The river paired the 5, I bet, the cold-caller folded in disgust, and the BB showed AQo. I took a nice big pot because I saw an opportunity to build a bigger pot by waiting until the turn to raise. I also was able to disguise my hand a bit more by checking the flop, inducing a turn bet by a weaker A.

Some might say I should have made the turn 4 bets, figuring that the cold-caller would have come along, and there’s definitely an argument to make for that. But the flush draw was far from a 100% certainty, with an odd two pair definitely within his range as well. The river 5 made me a likely bigger two pair, and his disgusted fold to the river bet confirmed him on a flush draw.

Waiting until the turn to make the raise prices out the draws, even if players like this will call two bets cold when they are not priced in, and that’s but one more place where profit is made. And while I may not have absolutely made as much as I could have on this hand, by taking an unconventional approach, by not simply going for the conventional continuation bet on the flop, I got far more value than I would have otherwise.

Hand Analysis | No Comments »

The hand began innocently enough. After one weak player limped, a NL player who had come to our game raised. Two people cold-called, the player to my right went all-in for one bet, and I found pocket jacks on the button. With this action, I didn’t want to pump it preflop; with the players involved, it’s very likely one or more would pump it just to make a bigger pot, not because they actually had decent hands. The big blind called and we all saw a ragged flop of 9-7-2.

The big blind led out, the early limper and the initial PF raiser called, and then the player 2 seats to my right raised.

Now I had a (brief) history with this player. I think I’d played with him once or twice before, but I don’t recall him being really wild (although he was later to prove me wrong). Before we’d finished our first orbit at the new table, he’d raised preflop in MP, and in LP I made it 3-bets with KK. He made it 4 bets, with one person tagging along, and we all called. He bet blind before we saw a ragged jack-high flop. I called, and put him on AA, and we ended up heads up. He bet blind again before a Q hit on the run, and I called. He finally slowed down before the river, and then checked when a K hit, and he called my bet and then folded when I showed my rivered set. A couple of hands later, he straddled the blinds, indicating that he’s not as good a player as I’m sure he likes to think he is.

Well, I liked that flop, especially because the preflop bettor hadn’t raised the big blind’s bet, so I 3-bet it. the big blind called, and then the early limper made it 4 bets, and the raiser capped it, so 4 of us saw the turn. So if I’m dong my math correctly (my memory may have missed one or two bets), 5 of us took the flop for 2 bets (plus one all-in) for about $70, and then 4 of us calling to a cap on the flop is another $120.

A 6 hit on the turn, and all 3 in front of me checked. I couldn’t see where all the action was coming from. I though a set was possible, as well as an odd 2 pair. At least one might have had top pair with a decent kicker. So I decided to check behind. The river was another 6, and that made me think that it counterfeited the possible odd 2 pair. The BB bet, the initial raiser folded, the re-raiser called, and I called. The BB showed A9o, the re-raiser mucked, and I showed my JJ to take a humongous pot, more than $200.

At that point, I was up more than a rack ($200), and I’d been sitting there only half an hour. Yet I knew also that this was going to be a wild ride if I stayed. Yes, it was clear that I’m a better player than most of the folks there. But variance is a bitch, so I decided to take my variance on the good side, book it, and return later.

Hand Analysis, Stories From the Trenches | No Comments »

I was playing the Thursday morning tournament at Artichoke Joe’s a roundup tournament where the object is not to accumulate the most chips, but the most roundup discs, each worth $40 when the tournament ends. It’s a limit tournament and it was getting to the middle rounds, when most people would be considered “short stacked.” I was above average in chips and had been playing my usual pretty tight game.

I was in early position and found Q-9 suited and decided to try and take advantage of my image. I raised. I expected I’d get one or two callers, especially the blinds, who I knew liked to defend and even cold call raises, or I might just steal the blinds. But I got surprised when the cutoff 3-bet. I knew him to be a fairly solid player who didn’t typically get out of line, so I knew instantly that I was behind. He had a stack size about the same size as mine, and I knew too that he probably wouldn’t have 3-bet with “just” hands such as AK or AQ.

Still, I figured the blinds would fold to the 3-bet. I was surprised again when the BB called 2 more bets. I closed the action.

The flop was nearly perfect for me: Q-J-9. I’d flopped top and bottom pair. I figured there was a good chance I was good. I checked, planning to check-raise. I got what I wanted. The 3-better did indeed bet out, the BB called, and I raised. Both called.

The turn was a rather ugly 10, putting 4 to a straight on the board. I checked, the 3-better bet, the BB folded, and I called, planning to call down on the river.

But the river brought a miracle. Or, as it turned out, my miracle. (Actually, my second miracle of the hand.) I bet out and got called, tabling my full house. The 3-bettor showed his pocket kings, pretty much right along the lines of what I thought he’d have 3-bet with.

The interesting thing about this hand is that other than the big blind coming along, it progressed pretty much exactly as it should have, given the progression of the board. Yes, I got lucky trying to make a play, but when I hit the flop hard, he had 9 outs to improve (2 kings, 3 jacks (for a bigger 2 pair), and 4 10s). He had the right pot odds to call my check-raise. The turn 10 meant I had to come from behind, with 4 outs, and although I wasn’t quite getting the right odds to call the turn bet, with the stacks getting as short as they were and the pot as big as it was, it would not have been correct to fold on the river if I had not hit.

But it was still pretty stupid luck that I hit twice in one hand.

P.S. I did finish in the money.

Bad Beats, Hand Analysis | No Comments »

The one god thing I can say is that the vast majority of players would not have lasted as long as I did.

I got to Artichoke Joe’s late for the morning tournament, but there was an open seat in the $6/$12 game, so I took it. I had a known bad/loose player on my immediate left, but I recognized only a couple other people at the table. My game plan was to play a tight session. What I didn’t expect was that the session would consist of almost entirely preflop folds.

The session lasted 2 1/4 hours. During that time, I won not one pot. I had not one pocket pair above 8s, and the best non-pair hand I had was AQ suited.

Interestingly, the pockets 8s was a hand where I was in a great position. I was on the button after several limpers, and I saw a flop of 5-3-3. Everyone checked, and only 2 people called my bet (one was the loose/bad player on my left, who was in the small blind). A jack on the turn changed little; it was checked to me again, and both called my turn bet. But the SV bet an A on the fiver, and the cutoff (on my right, the other caller all the way) raised. I had to fold.

The AQs hand saw a coordinated, suited board, and I had to fold to a bet.

Meanwhile, I hit no blind hands. Rarely did I even have limp-able hands–suited connectors in late position. A J-9 suited hand once hit middle pair that was bet and called to me. Another fold.

Perhaps the best chance I had was my last, shorts stacked, I limped with KQ. I was very happy to see a K-x-x flop, and I was able to get all-in–only to have a player with 99 hit his set on the river, a 2-outer to send me home.

It’s just frustrating to have sessions such as these. Patience is such an important discipline in the limit game, so waiting for the right opportunity is part of the game. But more than 2 hours worth? That is just painful.

Some might wonder why you don’t try to “make something happen.” Well, there are two primary reasons. First, raises will not get people to fold who have decided that they are going to play a hand (I saw one hand that was capped preflop, and one player–who won on the river–call all the bets to that point with J-10 offsuit), and they will usually play them to the river, so bluffing is nigh unto impossible. You have to enter a hand with an edge, with a better hand, or at least not far behind the likely holdings of others. Second, the small amount of attention people are paying will allow them to recognize when you pop-up suddenly with raises. And more often than not, they will also not fold. So you’re really tossing chips in the pot with little chance of chipping up, meaning it’s almost always a -EV play, resulting in getting felted a lot sooner.

No, because limit games are about exploiting edges, when you go card dead, you have no edge. And you have to be patient and wait, even if waiting means you simply see your stack get blinded away from hours on end. That’s the formula for long-term success.

Stories From the Trenches | No Comments »

It was an awful session. Just awful. No, I wasn’t suffering bad beats. I was just completely, utterly card dead. An hour went by and I’d done little more than post blinds. I’d seen one pocket pair (8s), and most of the rest was trash, trash, trash. I didn’t hit any of the random big blind hands I got to see (and I folded a few to raises; even with a couple of cold callers, 7-2 offsuit is still not playable), and I folded almost all of my small blind hands.

The latter means that I ended up with probably $20 or so more than I would have if I routinely completed. Your profit is comes not only from the pots you win, but in the money you don’t put in the pot when it is not right to do so.

It was even a bit more annoying because I had changed seats early on to get the two biggest calling stations at the table on my immediate right.

So even after all that, after a couple of limps that went nowhere, after probably 40-50 hands at the table, the slow whittling away of my stack still amounted to just half of my buy-in. And then I had a chunk but away. I made a middle-position limp with K-9 suited. The usual several callers–but then one of the blinds raised. Everyone called, of course, including me, and I hit the flop of A-K-9 big. Or so I thought. The initial raiser bet out, and I raised. But one of the limpers on my left surprised me by cold calling after asking is a loud voice “You raised?”. The turn was a blank and my bet kept in only the player on my left. The river was another blank, but I had no idea what this limper had, so I just check-called, and then mucked when he showed AK,

I was down to a stack and a half, about $60. I decided to make a play a few hands later when I found 98 suited in early position after one of the calling stations on my right limped. Everyone folded, but the same blind who had raised the earlier hand I played made it 3 bets. The early limper cold called, as did I, closing the betting.

The flop came perfectly: 7-6-5 rainbow. Not only did I hit a miracle flop, there was no way anyone could put me on the hand I had. The blind bet out, the calling station called, and I raised. The blind made it 3 bets, the calling station came along (it’s what calling stations do), and I capped. All called.

The turn was a blank. The blind bet out again. The calling station called. I raised again. This time, they both just called. The river didn’t improve anyone, and it was checked to me, and of course I bet, still having the stone-cold nuts. The blind better paid me off. And I rebuilt my stack to nearly my starting buy-in on one hand.

Unfortunately, a couple of players started to leave, and it wasn’t long before the game broke. There was just one other table going, and I ended up last on the list. I decided that I didn’t want to wait again, and as I was down just $10 after 2 1/2 hours of almost complete card-deadedness, I decided to cash out, head home, and get myself ready to play again another day.

But here’s the thing: It’s because I played with discipline, because I folded trash hand after trash hand instead of chasing luck, that I ended up losing just the $10. Without that discipline, I could have been out a lot more, or even felted by the end. It comes back to what I said above, the money you don’t throw in the pot chasing longshots is the money you take with you when you leave. It’s what they mean when they say most people “play too many hands.” And it’s why, even after this year has been somewhat of a grind, I still show a long-term profit on the felt.

Hand Analysis, Stories From the Trenches | No Comments »

I’ve been playing a bit more at Lucky Chances in recent weeks. I’d been getting involved in some tough games at Artichoke Joe’s, despite the claim of day games being “soft,” and despite the additional jackpot drop at Lucky Chances (they take $2, in addition to the $3 rake), I thought a change of scenery and a change of players might revitalize my game.

Well, I have had a couple of down days, but overall, it’s been moderately successful. When I arrived, I found two games going, and after looking at the folks at the two tables, I decided on the one I wanted, to the point that if I was called to the other, I was going to ask for an immediate table change as soon as a seat at the other table was open. Serendipity stepped in, as the open seat was at my favored table.

To my dismay, one of the loose/bad players I had seen at the table was the one who had gotten up. To my delight, I was just to the left of a player who professed to be the best player out there (he’s not). Across the table from me, in seat 5 (I was in seat 9) was a real “ATM,” or someone who just spews chips and will call down anything. I didn’t know this at first, but I learned it after just a few hands.

Unfortunately, I found a calling station also to my immediate left, not the best position to have a player like that, but once I found out his tendencies, I was able to manage the situation OK.

The seat 5 ATM allowed me to relentlessly bet for value on the river when I had decent, but not outstanding hands. A couple of times he just limped when I was on the button, the intervening players folded, and I was able to raise, in an attempt to isolate, with far weaker hands than I might normally even call with. (Once, the tactic “backfired” when I held Q-9 offsuit and both the small and big blinds called–until I flopped the nut straight with J-10-8 and got all three to call my flop bet, two to call my turn bet, and the small blind call my river bet.)

Over the course of the session, a player I knew sat down two seats to my right, someone I know who was loose but tricky. A short while later, he moved to two seats to my left, a less desirable position for me. Also, a couple other loose-passive players left, and were replaced by players who I perceived would be more difficult to beat. I was up a bit, and decided that it had gotten to the point that only the presence of the “ATM” made the game still good, and that when he went broke and left (as I knew he would), I’d go too.

The eventual timing made it seem like a bit of a hit-and-run, but I cold-called a raise by Mr. “best-player-here with AQ and hit an ace on the flop (he folded his pocket kings face up on my turn bet), then limped with A-10 a couple of hands later, hit an ace on the flop, and turned a 10, and the last player in didn’t call my river bet. That also managed to be the last chips of Mr. “ATM,” and his seat was empty moments later. I was only two hands away from the blinds, so even though I had gone from slightly ahead to almost doubling up my buy-in, I kept my promise to myself and left myself when the big blind came around to me.

I was not willing to risk my profit on a table that was demonstrably tougher. With poker being fundamentally about making good decisions, this decision, at this time, for this reason, was a good one, and a type of one that is good for the long-term health of my bankroll.

Stories From the Trenches | No Comments »

It was a good way to start the week: Win the Monday tournament at Artichoke Joe’s.

I would have been happy to chop at the final table, as is common. I made it to the final table with about a middle-of-the-road chip stack. The chip leader was on my immediate right, and the next biggest stack was on my immediate left. (The leader had gotten incredibly lucky to accumulate most of his chips.) Neither one wanted to chop, and there were a couple of very short stacks at the table.

But my patience paid off, patience that a long-gone player claimed would cost me success in this tournament. The chip leader was still trying to be aggressive a few hands in when I found pocket queens and made it 3 bets. I was called-all-in by the big blind, and the initial raiser called. I was very happy to see a flop of A-Q-8, as was the big blind who had A-8. The original raiser bet out, and I of course raised. He called, and eventually called my river all-in bet and showed Q-J. The was a big chip up.

We had knocked out a few smaller stacks and down to 5, but the two who had had the biggest stacks to start the table still didn’t want to chop, and neither did another player who had chipped up some as well. Again, the player on my right raised, and I found AQ and 3-bet, trying to get it heads up. Interestingly, the player to my left cold-called, and the original raiser went all-in with less than a full bet, which we called. The flop came A-A-x. I bet out, and the player on my left raised, which put me all-in. He had JJ, and I more than tripled up.

What was wild became downright bizarre at the end. I was a huge chip leader at the point, with more than 60K in tournament chips. Second place had about 10K, and third place had less than a thousand, with blinds at 5K and 10K. The second place person offered to just pay off the first, second, and third place monies as the chips stood, which I was more than happy to do. (I was prepared to offer a chop that had me take most of the first-place money.) But the third place player didn’t want to do it, even though she was big blind (and all-in) the next hand, which (a) the other player folded, and (b) I was able to see for free and won. The second place guy made the same offer, and I gladly accepted. So for the first time, I took home full first place money without any sort of chop or deal, a nice payday of $1150.

Like I said, a nice way to start the week.

Stories From the Trenches | No Comments »

Today’s roundup tournament was interesting, and not just because I finished in the money, with 5 roundup discs. No, it’s interesting because of three hands in which I got very, very lucky. I also made one bad decisions that cost me a better finish.

I began the tournament completely card dead. The only hand I really played was a J-9 offsuit in the big blind with 4 other players, and when I hit middle pair, on a K-9-x board and no one bet on the flop, I bet out on the turn when blank fell. I was surprised to get 2 callers, and I shut it down when an ace hit the river.

Still, at the break, I had T$700 of my T$1000 starting stack. Yet the early orbits after the break were going no better, and my chips continued to dwindle. I was not the only short stack at the table wither, as a couple of players had chipped up pretty well. Finally, I decided to make a stand. I raised all-in from middle position after it had been checked to me with J-10 suited. To my dismay, it was reraised, and that reraise got two callers(!), putting three of us all-in. My feeling got worse when the reraiser had 10-10 and one of the callers had A-J offsuit. I think the last player had a small pair. Three of the cards that could help me were in other players’ hands. This just made a bad situation worse.

Miracle flop! It included the Q and the 9 of diamonds, giving me a straight flush draw. According to my odds calculator (looked at afterward), I’m actually a favorite: 56% to win the hand. I caught another diamond on the river and quadrupled up to get a decent stack.

Table broke, moved to another table. Mostly uneventful until we got to the 160/300, 300/600 round. A couple of early position players just limped, and the small blind raised all-in for T$220 more. I looked down to see an ugly Q-5 offsuit, but groaned when I made the call.

And what a flop. Q-J-5. I had flopped two pair, quite a strong hand.

Now tournament strategy dictates that when multiple people are in a hand, you check the hand down to increase the chances that one of those hands will win, thus busting out the all-in and moving everyone left closer to the money. But when you flop a really strong hand, you don’t need to do that.

So I bet out, figuring that the other two players would understand tournament strategy and get out of the way.

I was wrong. The player next to me raised. And then the other player in cold-called. Wow!

I thought for a bit, slightly worried about a QJ holding, but then decided to reraise. Both just called. I eventually got my whole stack in on the turn when a blank fell, and both called that too.

The reraiser had KQ for just top pair, while the cold-caller had AK. I more than tripled up and got myself a huge stack. But I wasn’t done.

We were down to two shorthanded tables when I found pocket 10s and raised. I got two callers. I hit a set on the flop, which had one overcard, and one of the callers bet out. I raised, and both called. The turn was a blank. It was checked to me, I bet, and the both called. The river was the case 10, giving me my third four-of-a-kind in tournament play this week. Again, they checked. Again, I bet, and again, they both called.

By then, it was an easy coast to the final table, where I finished third in chips and with 5 roundup buttons for a nice $200 cash.

Oh, the mistake.

Shortly after I made the quads. an aggressive player raised in early position, and a somewhat passive player cold-called. I looked down to see AK offsuit. Normally, I’d probably 3-bet, but I was thinking at the time of just coasting to the money. I thought about it for a bit and folded. And ace hit the flop, and K hit the turn, and the A-J offsuit of the cold-caller beat the pocket 7s of the original raiser. It was a bad decision on my part, and the results, while irrelevant to the decision, would have left me with the cold-caller’s roundup buttons too, which would have meant a bigger cash at the end.

Bad Beats, Hand Analysis, Stories From the Trenches | No Comments »